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This article discusses the reliability of non-expert voice identification evidence. While much attention has been paid
to the frailties of eyewitness evidence, little attention has been given to the frailties of ‘earwitness’ evidence, even
though it has been tendered in several wrongful conviction cases. The author reviews the results of the empirical
literature that has examined the reliability of earwitness evidence. The author also analyzes the principal factors used
by Canadian criminal courts to assess earwitness reliability in light of the empirical study of those factors. The
general conclusions are that earwitness evidence can often be quite unreliable and that the courts have not always
properly assessed its reliability.

On November 3, 2006, two armed men, one white, one black, invaded the southwestern
Ontario home of Duane and Deirdre Hicks.1 They tied up the occupants, demanded money, and
ransacked the house for electronics. The black intruder even took Mr. Hicks to the bank to
withdraw money. The police quickly charged Joseph Webber with the robbery, alleging that he
was the white intruder. That intruder wore a balaclava during the robbery but the area around his
eyes remained exposed. At Webber’s trial, Mr. Hicks testified that he was able to recognize
Webber by his eyes, the way he walked, and his voice. Hicks had the opportunity during the
robbery to see and hear the white intruder when he was only a few feet away. Hicks had known
Webber for many years, had occasionally socialized with him, and two years earlier had hired
him to do work on the Hicks’ house. Hicks also testified that the black intruder called his partner
Joe and that the white intruder mentioned he had a drug debt to pay, something that was of
interest given that two weeks before the robbery Webber had asked Mr. Hicks for a loan to repay
a drug debt. Based on this evidence, the trial judge convicted Webber and sentenced him to
seven-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. The only problem was that Webber was innocent. The
Faculty of Law, Western University. My thanks to Ian Scott for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Any remaining errors are my own.
1
Most of the information in this paragraph was obtained from the facta filed in the Court of Appeal for Ontario by
the Crown and defence in R v Webber, Court File No.C48841.
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police themselves discovered this by happenstance when another man named Justin Parry
confessed to the crime in June 2008. The police corroborated the confession, located the
accomplice (who also identified Parry as the white intruder), and found no connection between
Webber and Parry. The Crown eventually asked the Court of Appeal for Ontario to acquit
Webber. The Court did so on January 7, 2010, commenting that “the Crown acknowledges that
the fresh evidence overwhelmingly shows the appellant did not commit these crimes.”2
Joseph Webber’s case exemplifies the familiar frailties of eyewitness identification but it
also highlights another, much less discussed phenomenon: the frailties of voice identification,
sometimes called ‘earwitness’ evidence. Earwitness evidence is less common than eyewitness
evidence, and it is often heard in combination with eyewitness evidence, but it can be important
and even critical in criminal prosecutions. It is routinely needed when the Crown relies on
evidence of intercepted communications, as in many conspiracy and narcotics trials. It can also
be crucial in cases where the perpetrator wore a disguise, when the victim was blindfolded or
otherwise unable to make reliable observations, or where the offence was committed over the
telephone. The evidence is admissible in Canadian courts under the general rules of admissibility.
When tendered through a lay witness,3 it is not considered opinion evidence and there are no
special preconditions to admissibility.4
The contribution of mistaken eyewitnesses to wrongful convictions has been well
documented. The contribution of mistaken earwitnesses has not. But Joseph Webber is not the
2

2010 ONCA 4 at para 1.
Expert evidence of voice identification is sometimes tendered but it is beyond the scope of this paper. I will be
dealing solely with non-expert identification evidence.
4
R v Williams (1995), 98 CCC (3d) 160 (Ont CA); R v Braumberger (1967), 62 WWR 285 (BCCA). The only
precondition, if one can call it that, is that the Crown must lay a foundation for the witness’ ability to identify the
voice (by adducing evidence that the witness had more than fleeting exposure to the voice outside of the criminal
encounter in circumstances where the witness could connect the voice to a particular person): R v Portillo (2003),
176 CCC (3d) 467 at paras 40-42 (Ont CA).
3

2

only victim of an incorrect voice identification. At Guy Paul Morin’s second trial, the victim’s
mother identified Morin’s voice as the one that uttered “Help me, help me, Oh God, help me” on
the night of the victim’s funeral – testimony that the prosecution used as evidence of
consciousness of guilt. The Commissioner examining Morin’s wrongful conviction concluded
that the voice identification evidence was “patently unreliable.”5At least 17 individuals have
been wrongly convicted in the United States based in part on faulty voice identification
evidence.6 In at least five cases, the voice identification evidence was critical to the prosecution’s
case. One of England’s oldest documented wrongful convictions was the product of mistaken
voice identification. William Hulet was convicted of high treason based substantially on the
identification of his voice as that of the masked executioner who hanged King Charles I. Another
individual (the regular hangman) subsequently confessed and Hulet was exonerated.7
As all of this illustrates, voice identification is not infallible. In fact, those who have
studied its reliability have variously characterized the identification task, at least as it relates to
unfamiliar voices, as “remarkably difficult”8 and “error prone”9 where performance is “very

5

The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: Report, Hon Fred Kaufman, Commissioner (Toronto:
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998) at 978. Ivan Henry may be another Canadian example. The
Crown’s case against him certainly included voice identification evidence: R v Henry, 2010 BCCA 462 at paras 114132. The case was also very weak, an alternative perpetrator has been identified, and Henry is sometimes included in
the list of Canada’s wrongly convicted: e.g. Joan McEwen, Innocence on Trial: The Framing of Ivan Henry (Canada:
Heritage House Publishing Company, 2014). But it is arguable that he has not been proven factually innocent.
6
See the names and sources listed in Appendix A. As is so often true, there may be some debate about the factual
innocence of some of these individuals but I limited my list to cases where there was fairly strong, even if not
always indisputable, evidence of innocence.
7
Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma, “Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in Court” (2003) 54 Hastings LJ 373
at 393-394, citing Trial of William Hulet, 5 Howell’s State Trials 1185 (1660).
8
Sarah Stevenage, Amy Howland and Anna Tipplet, “Interference in Eyewitness and Earwitness Recognition”
(2011) 25 Applied Cognitive Psychology 112 at 112 [hereinafter Stevenage, “Interference”].
9
A. Daniel Yarmey, “The Psychology of Speaker Identification and Earwitness Memory” in The Handbook of
Eyewitness Psychology, Volume II: Memory for People, R.C.L. Lindsay et al, eds (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum, 2007) 101 at 102 [hereinafter Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification”].
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poor,”10 “extremely inaccurate”11 and “likely to produce high false identifications.”12 This may
seem surprising, given the common experience we all have of easily recognizing voices. But care
must be taken not to generalize from experience with familiar voices in everyday situations to
assumptions about identification accuracy with less familiar voices in other contexts.13 Indeed,
one should not even assume that identification of familiar voices is inevitably accurate.14
In recent years, Canadian criminal courts have demonstrated an appreciation of both the
fallibility of earwitness testimony and some of the reasons for it. However, their analysis has
been informed by experience, intuition, and assumption rather than empirical study. That is not
to say that the courts have always got it wrong; on the contrary, they have often got it right. But
their assessment of earwitness testimony can only be improved by an understanding of the results
of the scientific study of voice identification. The point of this paper is to offer some assistance
in that regard. I discuss the results of the empirical studies. I compare the ways in which the
approach of the courts has coincided with and deviated from those results. I offer some thoughts
on how courts could alter and ultimately improve their assessment of earwitness testimony.
1. The (In)Accuracy of Voice Identification
As stated above, many researchers studying voice identification have expressed concerns
over its reliability. This stems in large part from the fact that studies have so often produced very
low accuracy rates. One study, for example, obtained a “hit rate” of 9%, meaning that only 9% of

10

Lisa Öhman, Anders Eriksson and Pär Anders Granhag, “Angry Voices from the Past and Present: Effects on
Adults’ and Children’s Earwitness Testimony” (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender
Profiling 57 at 59.
11
Howard Saslove and A. Daniel Yarmey, “Long-Term Auditory Memory: Speaker Identification” (1980) 65
Journal of Applied Psychology 111 at 114.
12
A. Daniel Yarmey, A. Linda Yarmey and Meagan Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications in Showups and
Lineups” (1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 453 at 463 [hereinafter Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications”].
13
Brian Clifford, “Voice Identification by Human Listeners” (1980) 4 Law and Human Behavior 373 at 374.
14
See, infra, section 3(a).
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the test subjects were able to correctly recognize a voice they had previously heard (the target
voice) from amongst a group of other voices in a voice lineup.15 Some other studies have
obtained hit rates, collapsed across experimental conditions, of 12%,16 13%,17 15-20%,18 1920%,19 and 24%.20 It is not uncommon for hit rates to be lower than the percentage of test
subjects who incorrectly indicate that the target voice is not present in the lineup21 and/or who
choose the voice of a lineup foil.22
Of even greater concern is the “false alarm rate” obtained in numerous studies: the
percentage of test subjects who, when presented with a set of voices, incorrectly identified
someone other than the speaker they had previously heard. An inaccurate positive identification,
after all, can lead to the prosecution of the wrong person. Test-subjects routinely select foils in a
target-present lineup (one that includes the previously-heard voice).23 More importantly, they
very often believe they recognize a voice in a target-absent lineup, i.e. a lineup that does not
contain the previously-heard voice. In such lineups, studies have obtained false alarm rates,
15

Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX at 458. The hit rate was 28% (lower than chance) in
the voice showup condition where test subjects only heard a single voice and were asked if they recognized it as one
they had heard five minutes before.
16
Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 63. This was chance level performance.
17
Lisa Öhman, Anders Eriksson and Pär Anders Granhag, “Mobile Phone Quality vs. Direct Quality: How the
Presentation Format Affects Earwitness Identification Accuracy” (2010) 2 The European Journal of Psychology
Applied to Legal Context 161 at 172 [hereinafter Öhman, “Mobile Phone Quality”]. This was chance level
performance.
18
Nils Olsson, Peter Juslin and Anders Winman, “Realism of Confidence in Earwitness versus Eyewitness
Identification” (1998) 4 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 101 at 107.
19
Lisa Öhman, Anders Eriksson and Pär Anders Granhag, “Enhancing Adults’ and Children’s Earwitness Memory:
Examining Three Types of Interviews” (2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 216 at 223.
20
José Kerstholt et al, “Earwitnesses: Effects of Accent, Retention and Telephone” (2006) 20 Applied Cognitive
Psychology 187 at 192 [hereinafter Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses”]. This was the hit rate when test subjects were allowed
to indicate they did not know if the target was present amongst the voices (which 24% of them indicated). When
subjects were forced to make a selection, the hit rate increased to 34%.
21
See, e.g., Öhman “Enhancing,” supra note XXX at 224; Olsson, supra note XXX at 106-107; Öhman, “Angry
Voices,” supra note XXX at 63; Lisa Öhman, Anders Eriksson and Pär Anders Granhag, “Overhearing the Planning
of a Crime: Do Adults Outperform Children as Earwitnesses?” (2011) 26 Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology
118 at 123.
22
See, e.g., Öhman, “Enhancing,” supra note XXX at 224; Olsson, supra note XXX at 106-107; Yarmey, “Face and
Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX at 458; Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 63; Öhman,
“Overhearing the Planning,” ibid at 123.
23
See all the sources cited ibid.
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across experimental conditions, of 99%, 24 98%, 25 85%, 26 43-93%, 27 70%, 28 67%, 29 56%, 30
53%,31 and around 50%.32 Those figures do not translate to the likelihood that in a real-life
situation an innocent suspect will be identified, since many of the false alarms would be foil
identifications ignored by the police, but they do illustrate the propensity of earwitnesses to
mistakenly identify voices. Furthermore, studies that pre-selected a particular voice to serve as
the innocent suspect in a voice lineup have still found substantial “misidentification rates,” such
as 13-14%,33 19%34 and 22%.35 Those rates were over and above all the foil identifications.

24

Lori van Wallendael et al, “‘Earwitness’ Voice Recognition: Factors Affecting Accuracy and Impact on Jurors”
(1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 661 at 666. Some of the test subjects had heard the target voice only a short
time before the lineup was administered. All test subjects were cautioned (albeit subtly) that the target might not be
present in the lineup.
25
Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX at 458. Test subjects were exposed to the voice
during an innocuous encounter that lasted about 15 seconds. Testing occurred about five minutes later. Subjects
were warned that the target might not be present in the lineup.
26
Harriet Smith and Thom Baguley, “Unfamiliar voice identification: Effect of post-event information on accuracy
and voice ratings” (2014) 5 Journal of European Psychology Students 59 at 62 and 64. Some of the test subjects
were given misleading information about the pitch of the target voice prior to selecting a voice from the lineup, but
the misinformation had no effect on overall accuracy.
27
Sarah Stevenage, Gabriella Clarke and Allan McNeill, “The ‘other-accent’ effect in voice recognition” (2012) 24
Journal of Cognitive Psychology 647 at 650 [hereinafter Stevenage, “The ‘other-accent’ effect”].
28
A. Daniel Yarmey, “Earwitness descriptions and speaker identification” (2001) 8 Forensic Linguistics 113 at 118
[hereinafter Yarmey, “Earwitness descriptions”].
29
Axelle Philippon et al, “Earwitness Identification Performance: The Effect of Language, Target, Deliberate
Strategies and Indirect Measures” (2007) 21 Applied Cognitive Psychology 539 at 545. That is the false alarm rate
for voices speaking a familiar language. The rate for voices speaking an unfamiliar language was even higher at
93%. All test subjects had heard the target voice about 30 minutes earlier, were instructed to pay attention to the
voice, and were told that the target voice may not be present in the lineup.
30
Charles Thompson, “A Language Effect in Voice Identification” (1987) 1 Applied Cognitive Psychology 121 at
126.
31
Öhman, “Overhearing the Planning,” supra note XXX at 123.
32
José Kerstholt et al, “Earwitnesses: Effects of Speech Duration, Retention Interval and Acoustic Environment”
(2004) 18 Applied Cognitive Psychology 327 at 331 (51%) [hereinafter Kerstholt, “Effects of Speech Duration”];
Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 192 (50%). In both studies, the test subjects knew the experiment
concerned voice identification and were warned that the target voice might not be in the lineup.
33
A. Daniel Yarmey, “Earwitness identification over the telephone and in field settings” (2003) 10 Forensic
Linguistics 62 at 69 [hereinafter Yarmey, “Earwitness identification”].
34
Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX at 458. Subjects were tested within minutes of
hearing the target voice and were told that the voice might not be in the lineup.
35
Tara Orchard and A. Daniel Yarmey, “the Effects of Whispers, Voice-Sample Duration, and Voice
Distinctiveness on Criminal Speaker Identification” (1995) 9 Applied Cognitive Psychology 249 at 254. This is the
false identification rate collapsed across all experimental conditions but only for non-distinctive voices. The
equivalent rate for distinctive voices was 6%. Test subjects were told to listen carefully to the target voice for
purposes of later identification. They were also told that the target voice might not be present in the lineup.
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Not all studies have obtained poor accuracy rates. Indeed, some have obtained fairly good
rates. For specific lineups, one occasionally sees hit rates of or in excess of 90% and false alarm
rates of less than 10%.36 More commonly, one can find hit rates in the 35-65% range and false
alarm rates in the 20-40% range, at least in certain experimental conditions (albeit sometimes
with poorer rates in other conditions). 37 Some researchers in the 1980s posited an overall
accuracy rate of 60-70%,38 although more recent estimates are much less optimistic.39 In the end,
the variety of results and methodologies in the different earwitness studies probably makes it
impossible to come up with an overall, generally applicable, accuracy rate. Accuracy is very
much a product of specific factors and specific circumstances. Earwitnesses can be reliable.40 In
a variety of situations, however, they can be quite inaccurate and prone to misidentify. As a
result, one must endorse the conclusion of many researchers that courts should exercise great
caution and care before placing reliance on earwitness testimony.41
2. Voice Identification Evidence in Canadian Law

36

See, e.g., Orchard, ibid at 253-254 (perfect scores in one of the 8 minute exposure conditions); van Wallendael,
supra note XXX at 666 (in two of four target-present lineups, although the authors cautioned that the targets in those
lineups had distinctive voices, and the same study also produced extremely high false alarm rates in the target-absent
lineups, usually 100%).
37
E.g., Judith Goggin et al, “The role of language familiarity in voice identification” (1991) 19 Memory &
Cognition 448 at 451 (most hit rates between 35% and 65% and false alarm rates lower than 40%); Susan Cook and
John Wilding, “Earwitness Testimony: Never Mind the Variety, Hear the Length” (1997) 11 Applied Cognitive
Psychology 95 at 101 (overall hit rate of 38% for unfamiliar voices); Yarmey, “Earwitness descriptions,” supra note
XXX at 118 (hit rates of 47% and 55% and false alarm rates of 33% and 38% in target-present lineups); Kerstholt,
“Effects of Speech Duration,” supra note XXX at 331 (hit rate of 42% and false alarm rate of 24% in target-present
lineup, albeit with a 51% false alarm rate in the target-absent lineup).
38
Ray Bull and Brian Clifford, “Earwitness voice recognition accuracy” in Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological
Perspectives, Gary Wells and Elizabeth Loftus, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) at 120. See
also Thompson, supra note XXX at 125.
39
See, e.g., Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 67: poor performance in the study “concurs with the
suggestion that real-life conditions will result in earwitness performance at chance level”; Daniel Read and Fergus
Craik, “Earwitness Identification: Some Influences on Voice Recognition” (1995) 1 Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Applied 6 at 16: “In more realistic circumstances, … the probability that the correct speaker will be
chosen is no better than chance.”
40
Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 102.
41
See, e.g., Kerstholt, “Effects of Speech Duration,” supra note XXX at 334; Öhman, Angry Voices,” supra note
XXX at 68.
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In recent years, Canadian criminal courts have recognized the need to proceed cautiously
when it comes to voice identification evidence. In the 2015 case of R v Dodd, for example, the
Ontario Court of Appeal commented that such evidence “ought to be treated with extreme
caution.”42 Courts in other provinces, both trial and appellate, have adopted a similar position.43
This speaks well of the Canadian position with respect to earwitness evidence. But four
qualifications must be added. First, one can certainly find cases where courts have treated voice
identification evidence with something less than “extreme caution.” The 2006 case of R v
Campbell is illustrative.44 Campbell was charged with robbing a video store. The issue in the
case was identity. The store clerk was the only person to give identification evidence. The robber
was previously unknown to her and she interacted with him on the date in question for five to ten
minutes. A month later she claimed to see him at a local mall. She recognized him by his
appearance and his voice. The trial judge cautioned himself regarding the frailties of eyewitness
evidence but said nothing about the weaknesses of earwitness evidence. On the contrary, he only
used the victim’s voice identification to help overcome any weaknesses with her visual
identification.45 On appeal, Campbell claimed that his conviction was unreasonable, in part
because the trial judge “gave undue weight to [the victim’s] recognition of the appellant's voice
as confirming her identification of him.”46 The British Columbia Court of Appeal said nothing
about that submission and only used the earwitness testimony to help justify the reasonableness

42

2015 ONCA 286 at para 79. From the same court, see also R v Clouthier, 2012 ONCA 636 at para 19; R v Quidley,
2008 ONCA 501 at para 36; R v Badgerow, 2008 ONCA 605 at para 9; R v Brown, [2003] OJ No 4592 at para 4
(CA).
43
E.g., R v Saddleback, 2013 ABCA 250 at paras 18 and 35; R v Pabla, 2013 BCSC 913 at para 23; R v J.E., [2011]
NJ No 38 at para 27 (Prov Ct).
44
2006 BCCA 109.
45
Ibid at para 35.
46
Ibid at para 68.
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of the trial judge’s decision.47 I do not claim that Campbell is typical of how courts treat voice
identification but it is also not so anomalous as to be extraordinary. A number of other court
decisions have demonstrated some insensitivity to the potential weaknesses of earwitness
evidence.48
The Ontario Court of Appeal has also taken the position that a warning to the jury about
the frailties of voice identification evidence is not always mandatory. In R v Masters, the Court
stated that it was not convinced a caution was mandatory in the case given the “significant body
of other evidence at trial capable of implicating the appellant as one of the speakers on the
wiretaps.” 49 This curious holding suggests that when the trier of law determines that the
corroborative evidence of identification is strong the trier of fact need not be warned that the
direct evidence of identification may be weak. That not only blurs the roles between the two
triers in a case, it also leaves a jury unassisted in assessing the weight to be given to a piece of
evidence that the jury may feel is a necessary element in finding proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Canadian courts also sometimes treat earwitness evidence no differently than eyewitness
evidence. One sees this in some of the general cautionary statements. In the 2012 case of R v
Clouthier, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote that “voice identification evidence,
like any identification evidence, ought to be treated with extreme caution.”50 The same court
47

Ibid at para 69. Only Finch CJBC, in dissent, addressed this issue but it is safe to assume the majority agreed since
they only said they differed from the Chief Justice in their view of how the trial judge used another piece of
evidence.
48
E.g., R v Mackinaw, 2010 ABCA 359 (forgiving a trial judge’s complete lack of self-caution regarding important
earwitness evidence); R v Wu, 2010 ABCA 337 at paras 29, 48 and 52 (responding to a concern over the frailties of
voice identification evidence by simply noting that the trial judge acknowledged the witness had no training in voice
recognition and that the witness was subject to “the usual scrubbing of cross-examination”); R v Masters, 2014
ONCA 556 (discussed immediately below).
49
Ibid at para 46.
50
Supra note XXX at para 19 (emphasis added).
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more recently commented that “[v]oice identification evidence is even more fraught with dangers
than eyewitness identification evidence”51 but its overall record is mixed. For example, it has not
repudiated its pronouncement in 1995 that “[t]here is no pattern of instruction that the trial judge
must give to the jury or to himself, if he is the trier of fact, with respect to this type of
identification evidence as distinct from the more usual identification evidence given by an
eyewitness.” 52 One can also see the same approach in the analysis of voice identification
evidence in particular cases. R v Henry, for example, was a prosecution that depended heavily on
voice identification as well as, and possibly even more than, visual identification.53 In assessing
the reasonableness of the verdict, however, the British Columbia Court of Appeal focused solely
on the weaknesses of eyewitness evidence, adding nothing specific about earwitness evidence.54
The Court in Henry ultimately declared the verdict unreasonable but, from an analytical
standpoint, it was inappropriate to effectively assimilate the two kinds of evidence. Studies have
shown that earwitness evidence is even less reliable than eyewitness evidence.55 It must therefore
be treated with greater caution than eyewitness evidence, not with the same amount.56
The last reason why one cannot be overly sanguine about the Canadian position regarding
earwitness evidence is that the courts do not always properly assess the variables that affect the
reliability of earwitness testimony. General cautions are helpful but what really matters is how
courts treat the various factors that relate to the trustworthiness of the specific earwitness
evidence in a given case. Courts certainly take into account a number of appropriate factors but

51

Dodd, supra note XXX at para 79.
Williams, supra note XXX at para 22. See, similarly, R v Rowbotham (No.4), (1977) 33 CCC (2d) 411 at para 46
(Ont Co Ct): “the jury must be cautioned with respect to the frailties surrounding such evidence in like manner to the
caution normally given in the case of visual identification.”
53
See supra note XXX at paras 113-138.
54
See, especially, supra note XXX at paras 77 and 139-141.
55
E.g., Yarmey, “Face and Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX; Olsson, supra note XXX.
56
See R v Pinch, 2011 ONSC 5484 at para 76.
52
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they do not always do so with the nuance required. They also sometimes rely on unhelpful
factors and fail to consider helpful ones. In the next part of this paper, I turn to an analysis of
some of the most important factors. I emphasize at the start that, in order to analyze the
performance of Canadian courts, I have had to isolate their use of a particular factor from the rest
of the evidence considered in a given decision. The reader must keep in mind that courts rarely
rely solely on voice identification evidence to convict and that any frailties in the analysis of
such evidence may not have had a significant impact on the overall validity of the ultimate
verdict.
3. Factors Bearing Upon the Reliability of Voice Identifications
a) Familiarity
The factor most commonly take into account by Canadian courts is almost certainly
familiarity. Courts routinely note that an earwitness had significant prior exposure to the
accused’s voice and thus was in a good position to recognize it during the commission of the
crime.57 Some courts have even divided earwitness evidence into recognition vs. identification
evidence in an effort to highlight the presumed reliability of the former and distinguish instances
where people are asked to identify the voice of a stranger.58
Familiarity is an entirely appropriate factor to take into account. Empirical studies have
supported the common sense assumption that significant prior exposure to a voice enhances the

57

E.g., R v Dobbin, (2013) 334 Nfld & PEIR 284 at para 32 (Prov Ct); R v Fitur, [2011] MJ No 94 at para 36 (QB);
R v Shea, 2010 NSPC 69 at paras 11 and 15. Courts have also taken into account lack of familiarity: e.g., Clouthier,
supra note XXX at para 20; Dodd, supra note XXX at paras 80-81.
58
E.g., R v Herman, 2010 BCSC 1068 at para 98; JE, supra note XXX at para 30.
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ability to identify it on a given occasion.59 Indeed, some studies have obtained results of near
perfect accuracy.60
It is important, however, not to assume that familiarity necessarily imports accuracy.
Familiar voices can be misidentified, sometimes at significant rates. One study obtained a 10%
misidentification rate from members of a close social network who had known each other for
almost two years and who currently or recently lived in the same residence.61 In other words, the
test subjects, hearing the voices of a series of close friends, incorrectly attributed a voice to the
wrong person 10% of the time.62 The hit rate was 68% and the other 22% of the time the test
subjects offered no opinion regarding the identity of the speaker. Another study of immediate
family members and best friends obtained a 5% misidentification rate.63 A judge who resolves
the issue of voice identification solely on the basis of familiarity, therefore, proceeds too quickly.
The judge also needs to consider the other factors that bear upon reliability. Hearing someone
speak only a small number of words, for example, has been shown to affect identification
accuracy of even very familiar listeners.64
There are also different degrees of familiarity. All the studies mentioned in the preceding
two paragraphs used test subjects who had amongst the greatest degree of familiarity with the
59

See Diane van Lancker, Jody Kreiman and Karen Emmorey, “Familiar voice recognition: patterns and parameters”
(1983) 13 Journal of Phonetics 19 at 20-21.
60
E.g., Harry Hollien, Wojciech Majewski and E. Thomas Dogerty, “Perceptual identification of voices under
normal, stress and disguise speaking conditions” (1982) 10 Journal of Phonetics 139.
61
Paul Foulkes and Anthony Barron, “Telephone speaker recognition amongst members of a close social network”
(2000) 7 Forensic Linguistics 180.
62
This was based on hearing about 9 seconds of speech over the telephone. Test subjects were simply asked to listen
to a voice and, if they recognized it, to write down the name of the speaker.
63
A. Daniel Yarmey et al, “Commonsense Beliefs and the Identification of Familiar Voices” (2001) 15 Applied
Cognitive Psychology 283 [hereinafter Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs”]. As in the Foulkes and Barron study, test
subjects were simply asked to listen to a voice and, if they recognized it, to state the name of the speaker.
Identifications were made as soon as the listener thought s/he recognized the voice – after hearing anywhere from 1
word to two minutes of speech. The hit rate was 85%.
64
This issue is discussed, infra, in section 3(b). See R v Meier, 2012 SKPC 41 at paras 23-26, 49-54, and 93, for an
example of a case where earwitness testimony was accepted largely on the basis of familiarity despite the fact that
during the crime the witness, who was highly stressed, only heard the perpetrator utter about 15 words.
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speakers’ voices. The accuracy of test subjects who do not have quite the same degree of
familiarity is generally lower. The aforementioned study of immediate family members and best
friends, who the study categorized as “high-familiar” subjects, compared them to “moderate
familiar” (co-workers, teammates, club-mates and general friends) and “low-familiar” subjects
(casual acquaintances who only spoke with the target for a few minutes on occasion in any week
over the preceding year).65 The respective rates were 85%, 79% and 49% for hits and 5%, 13%
and 23% for misidentifications.66 Another study showed that people who considered themselves
to be extremely familiar with a target’s voice, having heard it for more than one hour, identified
it only 31% of the time.67 It is not clear that Canadian judges have been adequately alive to the
significance of different gradations of familiarity. They have sometimes found and relied on
familiarity despite fairly vague evidence of the degree of prior exposure.68 They may also have
occasionally slotted a witness into a higher category of familiarity than appears to have been
warranted.69 The exact magnitude of the problem is difficult to discern70 but hopefully greater
familiarity with the relevant empirical literature will encourage proper sensitivity in the future.

65

The study actually referred to the groups as high-, moderate- and low-familiar “speakers” but it is clear that it was
the familiarity of the listeners with the speakers’ voices that was being measured.
66
Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 287-288.
67
Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 11-13. Thirty-one percent is the hit rate averaged across the three
experimental conditions.
68
See, e.g., Mackinaw, supra note XXX, in which the trial judge found that the victim recognized the accused’s
voice from an uncertain number of past encounters (possibly only one) at inexact dates in the past; R v Sanghera,
2012 BCSC 733 at para 145 (accepting a police officer’s identification evidence even though his personal dealings
with the accused “had been relatively limited, including, he estimated, two or three face to face meetings”); R v
Lamarche, 2010 YKTC 28 (“With respect to Mr. Brown's ability to identify Mr. Lamarche's voice over the phone,
even though Mr. Brown had difficulty giving specific details about the timing and frequency of his dealings with Mr.
Lamarche, I am satisfied, based on his evidence, that he was sufficiently familiar with Mr. Lamarche to be able to
recognize his voice”). I remind the reader that comments like these in this paper are only directed at the courts’ use
of a specific factor (in this case, familiarity) and not at the overall legitimacy of the judgments. It so happens, for
example, that the judge in Sanghera ultimately acquitted and the judge in Lamarche relied on significant
corroborating evidence.
69
See, e.g., Dobbin, supra note XXX, where the court found that an identifying witness was “very familiar” with the
accused’s voice after having heard it as little as 10 times over the preceding two or more years during the course of a
professional social worker-client relationship. In fairness, it is unclear that the court in Dobbin, or courts in any other
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Finally, there is the issue of expectation. An “elementary principle of psychology is that
context and expectations influence an individual's perceptions and interpretations of what he
observes.”71 When circumstances lead people to expect some fact, they tend to perceive that fact
in the face of ambiguous information. This can lead to error biased in the direction of the
expectation.72 This phenomenon of expectancy bias happens naturally and quite unconsciously
but it can be powerful.73
Researchers have suggested that expectancy bias can find application in the context of
voice identification. For example, Prof. Yarmey has written:
Misidentification of a familiar speaker … can occur through witness expectations.
Recognition of familiar persons often depends on the closed set of people likely to be
encountered in particular settings. People tend to hear who they expect to hear. Thus, if
observers (police) expect to hear a particular person answer a telephone, misidentification
of a familiar speaker may occur if someone else actually answers the call.74
To my knowledge, only one experiment has specifically sought to determine if expectation had
an effect on voice identification (finding that it did), 75 but the phenomenon is so wellestablished76 that it would be surprising if it did not have an effect. Indeed, some courts have
recognized that it is a factor that should be taken into account in assessing earwitness

case, used the term ‘very familiar’ to refer specifically to the highest category of familiarity studied in the
psychological literature.
70
Courts do sometimes explicitly recognize that there are different degrees of familiarity. See, e.g., J.E., supra note
XXX at para 30 (“in recognition cases the degree and circumstances of past associations between the witness and
the accused play a pivotal role in the weight the trier of fact must give to the evidence”).
71
D. Michael Risenger et al, “The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion” (2002) 90 Cal L Rev 1 at 12.
72
Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott, “The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases” [2006]
Wis L Rev 291 at 308.
73
See Saul Kassin, Itiel Dror and Jeff Kukucka, “The forensic confirmation bias: Problems, perspectives, and
proposed solutions” (2013) 2 Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 42.
74
Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 116.
75
Peter Ladefoged, “Expectation Affects Identification by Listening” (1978) 21 Language and Speech 373.
76
See Kassin, supra note XXX at 44.
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testimony.77 The problem is that it is rare to find a case where consideration of expectation
actually had an impact, even though the prosecution frequently tenders identification evidence
that could have been tainted by expectation. Witnesses, usually (but not always) police officers
involved in the investigation of the alleged offences, often testify to voice identifications first
made after they know the accused has been arrested or singled out as a suspect – such as when
they listen to a post-arrest interview and compare it (and only it) to a voice heard on intercepted
communications.78 In such situations, witnesses could be affected by the expectation generated
by the arrest or investigation that the voice they will hear is the voice they heard previously.79
Yet judges have commonly assessed and even accepted such identification evidence without any
clear consideration of the potential biasing effect of the context.80 Even when judges rely on
additional independent evidence of identification (as they often do), the weight they give to the
potentially tainted evidence should factor in the impact of expectation. Indeed, when an officer
familiar with a voice on intercepted communications is asked to listen to only the accused speak
to see if it is the same voice, the identification process is tantamount to a showup. Showups in
the voice identification context have been shown to be especially prone to error.81 Less weight

77

E.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 25; R v Willis, 2002 MBCA 138 at para 23, per Twaddle JA, dissenting;
R v Chan, 2001 BCSC 1180 at para 31.
78
E.g., Wu, supra note XXX at para 29 (“Known samples of the appellants' voices were acquired by [Sgt.]
Wieschorster in a post-arrest interview”). Many cases have reviewed the constitutionality of the police using the
post-arrest procedures to provide an opportunity for voice identification: see R v Oliynyk, 2008 BCCA 132 at paras
19-36, and cases cited therein. See R v Badgerow, 2010 ONSC 937 at paras 13-15, for an example of a case where
lay witnesses, after learning that the accused had been arrested, were asked if they recognized his voice on a taperecorded phone call.
79
They could also be affected by the related psychological phenomenon of motivational bias, where a person’s
perceptions and interpretations are tainted by preference for a particular conclusion. See Kassin, supra note XXX at
45.
80
See, e.g., R v Alcantra, 2009 ABQB 524 paras 86-89; R v Nestorovski, 2013 ONSC 2523 at paras 32-41.
81
Two studies have shown that false alarms are significantly higher in showups than in lineups: Yarmey, “Face and
Voice Identifications,” supra note XXX at 459; Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 70-71. In
the first study, the hit rate was lower than that expected by chance.
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would normally be given to eyewitness identification evidence collected in a showup.82 It is
difficult to understand why earwitness evidence should be treated differently.83
b) Exposure Length
In assessing the reliability of earwitness testimony, courts have frequently considered the
length of time that the witness was exposed to the perpetrator’s voice on the date(s) the crime
was committed. The British Columbia Supreme Court in R v Savoy, for example, held that voice
identification had not been proven partly because the witness only heard a “few sentences uttered
by the robber in the course of a robbery which he, [the witness], estimates to have had a duration
of about a half-minute.”84
Empirical studies have generally affirmed that exposure length is related to accuracy. The
research results have not been entirely consistent but on the whole they show that “[t]he longer
the opportunity to listen to a speaker, the greater the accuracy of identification.”85 Unfortunately,
there is no magical tipping point, before which voice identifications are not reliable and after
which they are. It depends in part on familiarity. If someone has had significant prior exposure to
a voice (along with the identity of the person associated with it) there is a good chance, in ideal
conditions, that s/he will be able to recognize it after hearing only a sentence or two.86 If the
82

R v Miaponoose (1996), 30 OR (3d) 419 (CA).
In the context of a civilian earwitness, the Ontario Court of Appeal has commented that a showup procedure was
“seriously flawed”: Clouthier, supra note XXX at para 22.
84
2000 BCSC 296 at para 35. For two other examples, see Dodd, supra note XXX at para 80; R v Whalen, 2007
NLTD 79 at para 65.
85
Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 120. Kenneth Deffenbacher et al have
suggested that the results of studies not showing an effect of exposure length may be partly attributable to the fact
that most of the studies tested immediate rather than (the more forensically relevant) delayed recall: “Relevance of
Voice Identification Research to Criteria for Evaluating Reliability of an Identification” (1989) 123 Journal of
Psychology 109 at 111.
86
I. Pollack, J. Pickett and W. Sumby, “On the Identification of Speakers by Voice” (1954) 26 Journal of the
Acoustical Society of America 403; Peter Bricker and Sandra Pruzansky, “Effects of Stimulus Content and Duration
on Talker Identification” (1966) 40 Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 1441; Phil Rose and Sally Duncan,
“Naïve auditory identification and discrimination of similar voices by familiar listeners” (1995) 2 Forensic
83
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speaker is a stranger to the listener, one does not usually see hit rates in post-event lineups
greater than 50% until more (sometimes much more) than a minute of exposure during the
event.87 False alarm rates for unfamiliar voices in target-absent lineups do not seem to change
much as exposure increases from around 20 seconds to eight minutes, often hovering around
50%.88
Some early research suggested that variability matters more than length, such that people
may be able to accurately identify voices based on relatively short speech samples as long as the
samples contain sufficient phonemic variety.89 To some extent this is a distinction without a
difference: increased variety will often accompany increased duration. The research findings are
also not entirely consistent90 and the early research may only apply to familiar listeners,91 so it
would be unsafe for courts to ignore exposure length. Certainly, as a practical matter, length is
easier for a court to gauge than phonemic variety. The research findings regarding variability are
more useful in providing reason to be extra cautious when considering short speech samples of
Linguistics 1. Some early research suggested that familiar listeners can accurately identify voices after hearing less
than a single word: e.g. Bricker and Pruzansky, ibid. More recent (and methodologically sound) research shows that
suggestion to be overly optimistic: see, e.g., Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 295 (finding only
a 30% hit rate and a 30% false alarm rate by familiar listeners after hearing one word). In R v Herman, 2010 BCSC
1068, the trial judge accepted that a familiar witness was able to identify a voice based on twice hearing the words
“100 times”. That may have been overly optimistic.
87
A. Daniel Yarmey and Eva Matthys, “Voice Identification of an Abductor” (1992) 6 Applied Cognitive
Psychology 367 at 370-371 (hit rates close to 30% after 18 and 36 seconds of exposure, close to 50% after two and
six minutes); Orchard, supra note XXX at 253 (hit rates mostly below 50% after 30 seconds, mostly above 50%
after 8 minutes); A. Daniel Yarmey, “Earwitness Identification Over the Telephone” (1991) Journal of Applied
Social Psychology 1868 at 1872 (hit rate of 48% after 7.8 minutes but only 24% and 30% after 3.2 and 4.3 minutes)
[hereinafter Yarmey, “Over the Telephone”]; Kerstholt, “Effects of Speech Duration,” supra note XXX at 333 (hit
rates all above 50% after 70 seconds, half below 50% after 30 seconds). Clifford, supra note XXX at 378-379,
obtained much better hit rates.
88
Yarmey and Matthys, supra note XXX at 373 (false alarm rates around 50% after 18 seconds, 36 seconds, two
minutes and six minutes); Yarmey, ibid at 1873-1874 (false alarm rates of 48%, 51% and 44% at 3.2, 4.3 and 7.8
minutes, respectively); Kerstholt, “Effects of Speech Duration,” supra note XXX at 333-334 (overall false alarm
rate of 51% across 30 and 70 seconds). Curiously, in Orchard, supra note XXX at 254, false alarm rates were
sometimes worse after 8 minutes than after 30 seconds.
89
See, e.g., Pollack, supra note XXX at 406; Bricker and Pruzansky, supra note XXX at 1444.
90
See, especially, Susan Cook and John Wilding, “Earwitness testimony: Effects of exposure and attention on the
Face Overshadowing Effect” (2001) British Journal of Psychology 617 at 622-623 [hereinafter Cook and Wilding,
“Earwitness testimony”].
91
Cook and Wilding, “Earwitness testimony,” supra note XXX at 618.
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limited variability. In R v Aulakh, for example, the evidence disclosed that the perpetrator of a
sexual assault repeatedly uttered a single three word phrase during the attack, which the
complainant claimed to recognize from encounters with the accused somewhat earlier in the
evening. 92 While the corroborating evidence of identification in Aulakh was extremely
powerful,93 voice identification evidence of that sort should probably be given no weight.94
Another important finding in the research is that people are generally quite poor at
estimating the length of time they heard someone speak on a particular occasion, often
overestimating it by a significant margin.95 In many cases, the only evidence of exposure length
will come from the earwitness. Courts should generally treat such evidence with scepticism.
c) Retention Interval
A factor listed by some courts as relevant to the assessment of earwitness testimony is
retention interval: the amount of time between the criminal event and the witness’ closest other
exposure(s) to the accused’s voice.96 The supposition is that, all things being equal, the reliability
of the testimony decreases as the retention interval increases. In truth, consideration of this factor
is not terribly common. While some courts may list it as a relevant factor, it is not often given
much emphasis in the analysis.97 Some decisions address evidence relevant to retention interval
92

2012 BCCA 340 at para 19.
It suggested that the accused had exclusive opportunity to commit the offence.
94
The trial judge in Aulakh gave the identification evidence some weight, albeit not much. The Court of Appeal held
that the evidence of exclusive opportunity was determinative. See supra, note XXX at paras 38 and 88.
95
This may be particularly true for short speech samples. Orchard, supra note XXX at 257 (mean estimates for 30
second and 480 second speech samples were 102 seconds and 517 seconds, respectively; 93% of test subjects
overestimated the 30 second sample); A. Daniel Yarmey and Eva Matthys, “Retrospective duration estimates of an
abductor’s speech” (1990) 29 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 231 (98% of test subjects overestimated a 72
second speech sample, by an average of 4:1; 51% of test subjects underestimated a five minute speech sample).
96
Chan, supra note XXX at para 31; Pabla, supra note XXX at para 23; Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75. The
other exposure(s) will occur before the criminal event in the case of a familiar voice and after the event in the case
of an unfamiliar voice, for example when the witness hears a voice lineup or showup.
97
It occasionally is. See, e.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at paras 14, 26, 29, and 34; Dodd, supra note XXX at
paras 80-82.
93
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mostly or entirely in the context of discussing other issues.98 Some decisions discount concerns
about retention interval.99
It is difficult to assess the mixed performance of the courts. The results of empirical
studies, which have focused almost entirely on unfamiliar voices, have been somewhat mixed as
to the impact of retention interval. Most show no real impact of intervals up to two weeks.100 The
results of the few studies that have investigated intervals longer than that have been inconsistent,
with one study finding a significant impact after three weeks101 and two others finding no or
limited impact after three and even eight weeks.102 To further complicate matters, in the real
world intervals longer than two or eight weeks will occur.103 This is an area where the empirical
studies do not offer maximal assistance to the courts. The general assumption is that memory for
at least an unfamiliar voice, just like for most other things, tends to decline over time104 but more
research is needed into the effect of intervals of several weeks and months, for both familiar and
unfamiliar voices. For now, courts would probably be wise to assume that after a few weeks
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See, e.g., Mackinaw, supra note XXX at 4, 10-13, where evidence relevant to retention interval was mentioned
during the analysis of whether, rather than when, the earwitness had heard the accused’s voice before. Evidence of
retention interval is often mentioned during the analysis of familiarity. See, e.g., Dobbin, supra note XXX at paras 2
and 32. Given the paucity of empirical studies of retention interval involving familiar voices (as discussed below), it
is hard to say whether the two issues are substantially distinct.
99
See, e.g., Lamarche, supra note XXX at paras 24-26, in which the trial judge found a voice identification to be
accurate even though the witness “had difficulty giving specific details about the timing and frequency of his
dealings” with the accused. There was significant corroborating evidence but the finding was not dependent on that
evidence.
100
E.g., Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 63-64 (no significant effect of a two week interval on adults,
although hits by children decreased); van Wallendael, supra note XXX at 666 (no significant differences across 0, 7
and 14 day retention periods); Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 12.
101
Clifford 1980, supra note XXX at 384-385 (accuracy not significantly different after two weeks vs one week but
significantly different – reduced to chance level – after three weeks).
102
Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 193-194 (finding a marginally significant decline in accuracy in a
target-present lineup over one, three and eight week intervals but an improved performance in a target-absent lineup
after three and eight week intervals versus a one week interval); A. Broeders and A. Rietveld, “Speaker
Identification by Earwitnesses” in Studies in Forensic Phonetics, Angelika Braun and Jens-Peter Koster, eds (Trier:
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1995) 24 at 34 (little difference in performance after three weeks vs. after one week).
103
See, e.g., Mackinaw, supra note XXX at para 4, where there was (or at least may have been) an interval of “a few
months”.
104
E.g., Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 121.
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retention interval has an increasingly detrimental, but not necessarily profound, effect on
identification accuracy105 – albeit one that may be less severe in the case of familiar voices.
d) Confidence
Another factor that has been of some interest to the courts is how confident the
earwitness is about his or her identification. Some judgments have been ambivalent about this
factor, acknowledging that confidence is not determinative of reliability106 and that a confident
witness can be mistaken.107 But the courts have not dismissed confidence as irrelevant and it
does seem to have factored into some decisions regarding reliability.108
This approach to confidence is similar to the approach taken in the eyewitness
identification context, where the courts have repeatedly cautioned against placing much weight
on confidence.109 Curiously, the approach of the courts may even be stricter in the eyewitness
context, where the Supreme Court of Canada has taken the position that there is a “very weak
link between the confidence level of a witness and the accuracy of that witness.”110 This is
curious because in the eyewitness identification context empirical studies have shown some
(qualified) correlation between confidence and accuracy,111 whereas the same cannot be said in
the earwitness context. Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between confidence
105

See Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 195.
Masters, supra note XXX at para 47; R v Danaii-Asil, 2011 ONSC 2230 at para 20.
107
Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 18. Arguably, in Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75, the Ontario Superior
Court went further in saying that “confidence does not substantially correlate to reliability.” The Ontario Court of
Appeal in Masters, however, seemed to interpret Pinch as saying that “witness confidence in voice identification
does not make the identification reliable”: supra note XXX at para 47.
108
E.g., R v Sharifi, [2011] OJ No 3985 at para 13 (SCJ); Sanghera, supra note XXX at paras 145 & 176. In neither
case was confidence considered to be the sole determinant of reliability but it was one factor taken into account.
109
See, e.g., R. v. Jack, 2013 ONCA 80 at para 30 (discussing the importance of “a caution about the diminished
correlation between a witness’ confidence level and his or her accuracy”).
110
R v Hibbert, 2002 SCC 39 at para 52. Arguably, the courts have sometimes even gone further and recommended
that no weight should be given to witness confidence. See, e.g., MacDonald 2014 ONCA 610 at para 15; R v Knox,
[2006] OJ No 1976 at paras 54-55 (CA).
111
See, e.g., Neil Brewer and Gary Wells, “Eyewitness Identification” (2011) 20 Current Directions in
Psychological Science 24 at 24-25.
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and voice identification accuracy and the general conclusion is that there is very little if any
correlation between the two.112 The findings have not been entirely consistent but many studies
have found no significant correlation113 and many others have found only a modest correlation in
only some experimental conditions.114 In a few instances, studies have even found a negative
correlation, with confident witnesses being less likely to be correct than unconfident
witnesses.115 This is yet another illustration of why earwitness testimony must be treated with
greater caution than eyewitness testimony, not with the same or less caution.116 In general, the
safest and wisest position for the courts to adopt is to completely disregard confidence as any
indicator of the accuracy of voice identifications.117
There may be one qualification to add to the above. There is some evidence that
confidence may have a useful correlation with accuracy when it comes to quite familiar voices.
Two studies found a significant correlation between confidence and accuracy for very familiar
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Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 110: “Confidence-accuracy correlations in
most studies on voice identification for unfamiliar speakers are nonsignificant or are relatively low.”
113
E.g., Öhman, “Overhearing the Planning,” supra note XXX at 124; Yarmey, “Earwitness descriptions,” supra
note XXX at 119; Goggin, supra note XXX at 457; Kerstholt, “Effects of Speech Duration,” supra note XXX at 335;
Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 194-195.
114
E.g., Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 70 (small but significant correlation in only one of
four experimental conditions, with no correlation in the other three); Yarmey, “Over the Telephone,” supra note
XXX at 1871-1872 (modest correlation found only for target-absent lineup, not for target-present lineup); Thompson,
supra note XXX at 128 (correlation only approached or reached significance when outliers were included);
Philippon, supra note XXX at 547 (significant correlation found for target-absent lineups but not for target-present
lineups or overall); Smith and Baguley, supra note XXX at 63 (significant correlation only found for male-voice,
target-present lineup; no significant correlation for female-voice or for target-absent lineups); Timothy Perfect,
Laura Hunt and Christopher Harris, “Verbal Overshadowing in Voice Recognition” (2002) 19 Applied Cognitive
Psychology 973 at 977.
115
Yarmey and Matthys, supra note XXX at 373 (significant negative correlations found in some experimental
conditions relating to voice samples of 18 and 36 seconds, although modest positive correlations found in some
experimental conditions relating to longer voice samples); Orchard, supra note XXX at 256-257 (negative
correlations found in experiments involving distinctive voices, although small positive correlations found when
results were collapsed across all experimental conditions).
116
See Olsson, supra note XXX at 116: “In comparable information-processing circumstances, the forensic system
should place more trust in eyewitness than in earwitness confidence.” See also Stevenage, “Interference,” supra note
XXX at 115-117.
117
See, e.g., Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 196.
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listeners: family members and close friends.118 Another study found a correlation when using the
voices of generally well known public figures.119 It may be premature to make too much of these
findings, though. Methodological differences make an overall assessment of the studies
somewhat difficult.120 One of the aforementioned studies also obtained inconsistent results across
two experiments. 121 And an entirely different study found no significant correlation at all,
although that result may be the result of not using any test subjects who were as familiar as
family members and close friends.122 If the courts are to consider confidence when assessing
identifications made by familiar earwitnesses, they should only do so in relation to the most
familiar category of witnesses.
An interesting question not really addressed in the empirical literature is whether lack of
confidence should be taken into consideration.123 Courts certainly consider lack of confidence to
be a relevant and sometimes important factor undermining the reliability of identifications,124
and the position may be defensible simply as a function of the burden of proof.125 But as matters
currently stand we do not truly know whether lack of confidence is indicative of lack of accuracy.
It may be that confidence of any sort is entirely unrelated to accuracy. Further assistance from
earwitness researchers would be welcome.
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Rose and Duncan, supra note XXX at 14; Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 289 (only when
speakers spoke in a normal tone of voice).
119
van Lancker, supra note XXX at 28-29.
120
For example, unlike other studies, Rose and Duncan, supra note XXX, included several familiar voices (rather
than just one) in the lineups, and included more familiar voices than foils.
121
In the second of two experiments, Yarmey and his colleagues did not find a significant confidence-accuracy
correlation for very familiar speakers (at least using one method of analysis). Indeed, the results of the second
experiment were, in one respect, the converse of the results of the first, a result the researchers found “difficult to
explain”: “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 297.
122
Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 16.
123
Studies occasionally provide some relevant information but no sustained research into the issue has been
undertaken.
124
See, e.g., Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75; J.E., supra note XXX at para 44,
125
Although one might ask whether the burden of proof compels a particular response to facts the value, rather than
the existence, of which is in question.
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e) Attention
A factor to which the courts make surprisingly little reference is attention: the degree to
which the earwitness made a conscious effort during the crime to pay attention to the
characteristics of the perpetrator’s voice. The case law lists it as a relevant factor126 and courts
sometimes explicitly consider it.127 But, given that it could be relevant to essentially every single
voice identification case, it is surprising that it is not more often given more explicit
consideration.128
Judges would be wise to pay more attention to earwitness attention. Several studies have
determined that subjects who are told in advance of an experiment that they will be tested on
their ability to identify a voice perform better than subjects who are not told.129 The positive
effect of attention has not always been found130 and it is certainly not the case that a witness who
specifically attended to the perpetrator’s voice will always be correct (or, conversely, that a
witness who did not will always be wrong). But, all things being equal, paying attention to the
characteristics of a voice improves the chances of later being able to identify it, and vice-versa.
It may be tempting to apply this conclusion to cases where the perpetrator’s voice is
captured on tape and someone – be it a police officer, judge or jury member – later compares it
to the voice of the accused, on the basis that in those cases attention is being closely paid to the
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E.g., Chan, supra note XXX at para 31.
E.g., Bubar, supra note XXX at paras 94 and 101.
128
In fairness, courts may sometimes be implicitly considering it, perhaps especially in wiretap cases where officers
listen to a sample of the accused’s voice for the specific purpose of comparing it to a voice recorded on tape.
129
Saslove, supra note XXX at 113; Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 69; Heather
Armstrong and Stuart McKelvie, “Effect of Face Context on Recognition Memory for Voices” (1996) 123 Journal
of General Psychology 259 at 265. Perfect and his colleagues found an effect in the same direction but it did not
quite reach statistical significance: supra note XXX at 976. See also Clifford 1980, supra note XXX at 382-383.
130
Cook and Wilding, “Earwitness testimony,” supra note XXX at 621.
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characteristics of the voice. That would be unwise. As explained above,131 ‘earwitnesses’ in
those cases can be affected by expectancy bias. No study on earwitness attention employed a
scenario where test subjects were told in advance whose voice it might be (never mind, that it is
alleged to be). It is simply not known whether the positive effect of attention would be attenuated
or even completely undone by the effect of expectation. Until we know more, the findings
relating to the effect of attention should only be applied to cases where earwitnesses attend to the
characteristics of a voice without previously being told who the speaker could be – or, perhaps
more frequently, to cases where earwitnesses do not specifically attend to the characteristics of a
voice.
f) Abnormal Speaking
Someone perpetrating a crime may not use his or her normal voice during the event. S/he
may deliberately attempt to disguise it so as not to be identified. S/he may also speak in a way
that is unusual for situational reasons: because of the demands of the event (which require
yelling or the use of an angry tone), because of the stress and emotionality of the situation,132 or
because of intoxication.133 Canadian courts have included disguise as a factor that diminishes the
accuracy of voice identification.134 They have also tried to take into account situation-driven
changes in voice.135 In both respects, they have been correct to do so. However, it may be that
courts should be even more cautious.
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See section 3(a).
Bull and Clifford, supra note XXX at 111.
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Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 118.
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E.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 25; Bubar, supra note XXX at para 86; Whalen, supra note XXX at
para 65; Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75.
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E.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 29; Bubar, supra note XXX at paras 86 and 93; Herman, supra note
XXX at para 106; Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75.
132

24

Four different studies have investigated the effect of having speakers intentionally
disguise their voices in almost any way they wanted. The hit rate for extremely familiar listeners
was 79% (leaving a 21% error rate).136 The hit rate for unfamiliar listeners in one study was
61%137 but in three others was quite low: subjects comparing a disguised voice with a speaker’s
normal voice made correct identifications at most one-quarter of the time. 138 Regretfully,
methodological issues make it a little difficult to interpret those results. The authors of the study
with the highest hit rate for unfamiliar listeners acknowledged that the rate was likely inflated by
the fact that the study simply asked listeners to decide whether individual pairs of speech
samples came from the same speaker.139 Conversely, it is possible that the methodology of one
of the other studies depressed the hit rates.140
That disguise can have a substantial impact on identification accuracy, however, is
supported by the results of two other studies that examined the use of one particular form of
disguise: whispering. Whispering can act as a disguise because it conceals vocal characteristics
such as pitch, inflection, and intonation.141 When test subjects heard whispered unfamiliar voices
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Hollien, supra note XXX at 142. Test subjects were classified as “extremely familiar” with the target voices
when they not only knew the speakers but also correctly identified all ten of the speakers, without any errors, in a
pre-test assessment.
137
Alan Reich and James Duke, “Effects of selected vocal disguises upon speaker identification by listening” (1979)
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 1023 at 1025. This was the hit rate when speakers were permitted to
disguise their voices in a manner they thought would best conceal their identity. The hit rates were slightly higher
when speakers were directed to use specific forms of disguise, reaching as high as 70% when speakers spoke at an
extremely slow rate.
138
Clifford, supra note XXX at 382 (26% hit rate); Hollien, supra note XXX at 142 (18%, 17%, 25% and 21%,
across four different groups); Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 13-14 (22% and 26%).
139
Reich and Duke, supra note XXX at 1027.
140
Hollien, supra note XXX at 141. Listeners were not asked to select a previously heard voice from a voice lineup.
Instead, listeners were given pre-test training on the names associated with the ten different unfamiliar speakers and
then, in the experiment, later asked to choose the correct name from a supplied list when hearing the voices played
on tape. Test subjects may have found it difficult to digest the pre-test information and keep track of the various
voice-name associations. That said, subjects were given a preliminary identification test using only undisguised
voices and even those who score quite well performed poorly in the actual experiment.
141
Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 118.
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they again generally achieved hit rates less than or equal to 25%.142 False alarm rates were also
high when subjects heard a voice lineup143 and the misidentification rate was over 50% when
subjects were simply exposed to an unfamiliar voice and asked if they could identify who was
speaking (the presumption being that they could not).144 These findings held true even when test
subjects were specifically directed to attend to the voice for purposes of later identification,145
when distinctive voices were used,146 and/or when exposure length was substantial.147 Familiar
voices did not always substantially change the results. In one study, test subjects hearing very
familiar voices achieved a 77% hit rate (and a 15% misidentification rate) but achieved a 35% hit
rate and a 39% misidentification rate when hearing moderately familiar voices.148
Similar or even worse results have been obtained in experiments where speakers employ
tones of voice (anger or emotionality) that may often be used in the commission of crimes.
Across six different experiments, the highest hit rate obtained was 33%; most rates were at the
level of chance.149 This was true even when test subjects were informed in advance that it was a
voice identification test,150 were tested immediately after exposure to the voice,151 and/or were
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Orchard, supra note XXX at 253 (across four experimental conditions, hit rates were 25%, 25%, 17% and 33%,
with the highest rate achieved only after subjects heard the whispered voice for eight minutes); Yarmey,
“Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 292 (20% hit rate after two minutes of speech).
143
Orchard, supra note XXX at 254 and 256 (53% to 83% across four experimental conditions).
144
Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 292 (58% misidentification rate after hearing the
whispered voice for two minutes). In Orchard’s study using target-absent voice lineups, lineup members specifically
chosen to serve as the innocent suspects were selected 12% of the time across the four lineups.
145
Orchard, supra note XXX at 252; Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 291.
146
Orchard, supra note XXX at 253-254.
147
Orchard, supra note XXX at 253-254 (eight minutes); Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 287
(two minutes).
148
Yarmey, “Commonsense Beliefs,” supra note XXX at 292. A moderately familiar speaker was a co-worker,
teammate, club-mate or general friend of the listener. Pollack, supra note XXX at 405, found that for familiar voices
equivalent hit rates were not obtained until subjects heard speech at least three times as long as a non-whispered
sample.
149
Saslove, supra note XXX at 113 and 115 (13%-33% hit rate, rates that were sometimes lower than chance); Read
and Craik, supra note XXX at 10, 12 and 14-15 (19%, 20% and 22% across three experiments – all not significantly
different from chance); Bull and Clifford, supra note XXX at 114 (33%); Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX
at 64 and 66 (chance level 5%-14%).
150
Saslove, supra note XXX at 113.
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exposed to as much as 40 seconds of speech.152 The one study to record false alarms obtained
rates between 43-53%.153 Even using listeners who were mildly familiar with the speakers did
not improve the results.154
All the results reported above reflect the accuracy rates achieved when test subjects were
asked to compare the voice of an individual using an abnormal voice with the voice of an
individual using his or her normal speaking voice. This is important. The available evidence does
not indicate that disguised, angry or emotional voices are inherently more difficult to identify
than unemotional voices. The generally poor results were more likely a product of comparing
normal to abnormal voices. Hit rates in studies where test subjects hear an abnormal voice both
initially and at test, for example, were generally (albeit not always) significantly higher.155 One
experiment even specifically tested to see whether voices were differently memorable depending
on whether they were emotional, finding no evidence that they were.156
This suggests that greater reliance can be placed on identifications by earwitnesses who
are exposed to the same kind or tone of voice both during the crime and at another time; the
similarity of exposure can assist them in making an accurate comparison and identification.157
Even then, however, the identification can be suspect. The one study that specifically sought to
explore the benefits of similar exposures found that hit rates for both unfamiliar and mildly
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Saslove, supra note XXX at 113; Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 64.
Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 61.
153
Öhman, “Angry Voices,” supra note XXX at 64.
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Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 11-13. Mildly familiar listeners had previously heard the speaker for more
than one hour. The study excluded anyone who was familiar enough with a speaker’s voice to identify it on initial
exposure.
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Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 10; Saslove, supra note XXX at 113; Orchard, supra note XXX at 254 (one
experimental condition only).
156
Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 14-15.
157
Some courts seem to have assumed as much. See, e.g., J.E., supra note XXX at paras 13 and 38; Saddleback,
supra note XXX at para 29.
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familiar earwitnesses, while improved, still did not usually rise above 50%;158 the rates were
even lower when the two exposures were not perfectly identical.159 Regretfully, the initial
exposure in that study was quite brief (only four seconds long) so the generalizability of its
conclusions is uncertain. But even if longer exposures would produce better results (as seems
likely), it may not be common in the real world for the various exposures to be similar enough to
generate high levels of accuracy. The authorities cannot force a suspect to speak at all,160 never
mind in a particular way, and it may be difficult for them to obtain, through observation of the
suspect, a voice sample similar in kind or tone to that used during the commission of the offence,
especially if it was a deliberately disguised voice.
g) Telephone Transmission
Courts have been concerned about the possibility that hearing a voice over the telephone
can interfere with the ability to accurately identify it. In R v Garofalo, for example, it was stated
that “[v]oice identification, by itself, is fraught with problems. It is even more uncertain when a
voice is identified over the telephone.” 161 Commentators have likewise been concerned,
hypothesizing that recognition may be impaired by the limited range of sound frequencies
transmitted over the phone.162
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Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 10 and 13-14. The most familiar listeners had previously heard the speaker’s
voice for more than one hour. All the other listeners had previously heard the voice, if at all, for at most an hour.
159
Read and Craik, supra note XXX at 13-14. In one variation of the experiments, test subjects were exposed to
emotional statements both initially and at exposure but the test statement was a re-recording, by the same speaker, of
the original statement rather than a replaying of the original recorded statement. The hit rate never exceeded 38%.
160
R v Turcotte, 2005 SCC 50 at para 52. The suspect also cannot be compelled to participate in a lineup: Henry,
supra note XXX at paras 40-58.
161
2012 ONSC 6351 at para 111. See, similarly, Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75 (referring to “difficulties which
the telephone imposes on voice identification because of the loss of acoustic information”); Whalen, supra note
XXX at para 61.
162
See, e.g., Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 122 (“Speaker identifications
involving the use of the telephone may have particular problems to overcome ... Degradations of the speech signal ...
are common because telephone lines typically transmit a band of frequencies between 300 and 3,400 Hertz whereas
human voices may contain components up to about 12,000 Hertz”).
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In addition, concerns have also been expressed about distortions introduced when
earwitnesses attempt to compare speech heard live with speech heard over the telephone. These
concerns are less commonly found in the case law163 (indeed, they frequently appear to be
entirely absent)164 but one does occasionally come across indications that courts are at least
comforted by evidence that an earwitness purporting to identify a voice heard over the phone had
previously heard the accused speak over the same medium.165
Surprisingly, neither of these concerns has been validated by empirical research. Only
limited research has been undertaken but the majority of the existing studies have failed to find a
significant difference in identification accuracy between voices heard over the telephone and
voices heard live. 166 This is true using both target present and target absent lineups. 167
Furthermore, no research currently supports the notion that accuracy is impaired when an
earwitness compares a voice heard over the telephone to a voice heard live, or vice-versa.168
This does not mean that judges should not concern themselves with possible impairments
to identification accuracy when voices are heard over the telephone. The quality of a particular
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They are found in the literature. See, e.g., H. Rathborn, R. Bull and B. Clifford, “Voice Recognition over the
Telephone” (1981) 9 Journal of Police Science and Administration 280 at 282-284.
164
Identifications of voices heard on telephone wiretaps are commonly made based on comparisons with live speech
without courts considering the potential effect of witnessing across different mediums. See, e.g., Wu, supra note
XXX at paras 29-30 and 47-53.
165
For example, in a case where the accused was found to have uttered a threat to kill over the telephone, the trial
judge mentioned that the recipient of the threat had previously spoken with the accused, “on the phone and in person,
ten to fifteen times”: Dobbin, supra note XXX at para 2.
166
Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 69 and 71; Perfect, supra note XXX at 976; Öhman,
“Mobile Phone Quality,” supra note XXX at 172-174. Rathborn, Bull and Clifford, however, found that witnesses
who heard telephone voices either at exposure or in the lineup, or both, were significantly less accurate than
witnesses who were only exposed to non-telephone voices: supra note XXX at 283.
167
Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 69.
168
Rathborn, supra note XXX at 283-284 (no significant difference in accuracy between telephone–telephone
condition and telephone–non telephone conditions); Kerstholt, “Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 194 (no
significant differences between telephone–non-telephone condition and either telephone–telephone or nontelephone–non-telephone condition); Öhman, “Mobile Phone Quality,” supra note XXX at 175 (“our results …
imply … that using a mobile phone recorded voice line-up when the voice is originally heard over a mobile phone is
not likely to improve identification accuracy”).
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transmission may be poor, there may be lots of ambient noise (for example, when someone uses
a mobile or public telephone),169 and some individuals may even speak differently over the
phone. 170 What the empirical studies do suggest, however, is that the mere fact that the
communication is over a telephone is not necessarily cause for concern. They also indicate that
police forces need not worry too much about specifically using telephone voices when
constructing voice lineups171 and courts need not worry when the police do not use them. All that
said, more research is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.172 For instance, it
may be important that no study has compared exposure to truly live telephone voices with
exposure to truly live voices both initially and at test; subjects are generally exposed only to
tape-recorded voices.173 There are very understandable practical reasons for this174 but, given that
the studies are trying to ascertain the possible impact of a medium of transmission (the
telephone), it is a bit worrying that the studies have used in the experiments a second medium of
transmission (the tape recorder) which may have its own impact.
h) Unfamiliar Accents and Languages
Witnesses are sometimes asked to identify the voice of a criminal perpetrator who spoke
with an accent or even in a foreign language. A few judges have been concerned about the
opportunity for error in these circumstances. Justice Twaddle of the Manitoba Court of Appeal,
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For a related example, see Dodd, supra note XXX, where voice was heard over a baby monitor through static and
the moaning of another man.
170
See Foulkes and Barron, supra note XXX at 182: “It is ... well known that some speakers adopt a ‘telephone
voice’, modifying their rate of speech, segmental pronunciations, and/or voice quality.”
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The police sometimes do this. See, e.g., R v Nichols, [2004] OJ No 6186 at paras 18-26 (CJ).
172
Kerstholt and his colleagues, for example, were unable to offer an explanation for why the results differed
between the Rathborn, Bull and Clifford study and the remaining empirical studies: supra note XXX at 196. I am in
the same position.
173
Yarmey used live voices during initial exposure but tape-recorded voices for the lineups: “Earwitness
identification,” supra note XXX at 64-67.
174
It could be very expensive, time-consuming and organizationally challenging to use truly live voices. It could
also introduce methodological problems in maintaining consistency across tests.
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for example, once wrote of the “danger, where the accused has an accent, that the witness is
identifying the accent rather than the particular voice of the accused.”175 That is, in essence, a
concern that people may not be able to distinguish readily between voices speaking in a manner
that is unfamiliar to the witness. It is a concern that has been borne out by the empirical literature.
A number of studies have tested the accuracy of individuals trying to identify the voice of
someone who speaks the same language as the listener but with a different accent. With English
speech, the listeners tested have come from the United States, England, Scotland and Australia,
and the accents studied have included Spanish, British, Scottish and Taiwanese accents. Other
experiments have used non-English speech, listeners from other countries, and other accents. In
most cases the bottom line result has been the same: people are worse at identifying accented
voices than non-accented voices.176 The difference has not always reached statistical significance
(although it often has) but the overall trend is consistent. In many cases, the difference in
accuracy has been in the range of 20%. Interestingly, the problem does not just arise when
people are hearing accents that are very foreign or different than their own. In fact, the study that
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Willis, supra note XXX at para 24, per Twaddle J, dissenting.
Stevenage, “The ‘other-accent’ effect,” supra note XXX at 650-651 (listeners from Glasgow, Scotland and
Southampton, England significantly worse at identifying speakers from the foreign vs. home location in targetpresent lineups; listeners from Southampton, but not Glasgow, made significantly more errors with Glaswegian vs.
Southampton speakers in target-absent lineups); Thea Vanags, Marie Carroll and Timothy Perfect, “Verbal
Overshadowing: A Sound Theory in Voice Recognition?” (2005) 19 Applied Cognitive Psychology 1127 at 11331134 (Australian listeners significantly better at identifying speakers from Australia vs. England); Kerstholt,
“Earwitnesses,” supra note XXX at 193 (Dutch listeners better at identifying “ordinary standard-accented” Dutch
voice than “regionally and socially strongly marked (The Hague) accent,” although the difference was only
marginally significant); Goggin, supra note XXX at 454 (monolingual English listeners from Texas significantly
better at identifying mid-western American speakers using their normal voice than when they used a heavy Spanish
accent, although the same was not true for English-Spanish bilingual listeners); Thompson, supra note XXX at 124
and 126 (mid-western American listeners better at identifying mid-western American English speakers vs. the same
speakers using a heavy Spanish accent, although the difference did not reach statistical significance and was only
found in a target-present lineup); Alvin Goldstein et al, “Recognition memory for accented and unaccented voices”
(1981) 17 Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 217 at 218-219 (identification by mid-western American listeners of
Taiwanese-accented vs. mid-western American voices significantly worse when initial exposure was a single word,
although not when it was a single sentence).
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obtained the greatest difference in accuracy was one that asked listeners in southern England to
identify voices of people from Glasgow.177
Studies testing the accuracy of individuals trying to identify voices of people speaking a
foreign language that the listener does not understand have obtained similar results. English
speaking listeners have been tested when hearing people speaking Spanish, German and French.
Polish, German, Chinese and Spanish speaking listeners have been exposed to people speaking
German or English. In most cases listeners were worse at identifying voices speaking an
unfamiliar language than a familiar language.178 A few studies have tried to investigate whether
accuracy is improved by partial, albeit incomplete, familiarity with a language. It does seem to
help.179 Unfortunately, it does not always eliminate the difference in accuracy180 and current
research does not indicate how much familiarity is necessary to have a substantial impact.181
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Stevenage, “The ‘other-accent’ effect,” supra note XXX at 650 (50% difference in a target-absent lineup for both
correct rejections and false alarms).
178
Olaf Köster and Niels Schiller, “Different influences of the native language of a listener on speaker recognition”
(1997) 4 Forensic Linguistics 18 at 23-25 (Spanish and Chinese speaking listeners significantly worse than German
speaking listeners at identifying a voice speaking German); Goggin, supra note XXX at 451-454 (English and
German speaking listeners both significantly less accurate when hearing the unfamiliar vs. the familiar language;
English speaking listeners also significantly less accurate when identifying Spanish vs. English speakers); Neils
Schiller and Olaf Köster, “Evaluation of a foreign speaker in forensic phonetics: a report” (1996) 3 Forensic
Linguistics 176 at 179 (listeners who only spoke English were significantly worse than native German speakers at
identifying German speaking voices); Philippon, supra note XXX at 545 (English speaking listeners from the United
Kingdom had a substantially higher false alarm rate when hearing a French vs. English speaker in both targetpresent and target-absent lineups, although the hit rate was identical); Thompson, supra note XXX at 124, 126, and
128 (in two of three experiments, English speaking Americans were significantly or marginally more accurate in
identifying English speakers than Spanish speakers; no difference was found in the third experiment that only used a
target-absent lineup but the overall false alarm rate in that lineup was 56% and the overall correct rejection rate was
only 13%); Hollien, supra note XXX at 142-144 (Polish-only speakers less accurate than English speakers in
identifying a voice speaking English).
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Schiller and Köster, ibid at 178-179 (English speaking listeners with some knowledge of German better than
English-only listeners at identifying a voice speaking German); Köster and Schiller, supra note XXX at 24 (“In all
cases (English, Spanish, Chinese), subjects with a knowledge of the target language (German) were able to identify
a German speaker better than subjects without any knowledge of the target language”); Kirk Sullivan and Frank
Schlichting, “Speaker discrimination in a foreign language: first language environment, second language learners”
(2000) 7 Forensic Linguistics 95 at 98-99 and 105-107 (some knowledge of Swedish improved the accuracy of
native English speakers when identifying a voice speaking Swedish, although the improvement did not increase as
knowledge of Swedish increased).
180
Köster and Schiller, supra note XXX at 23 (Chinese and Spanish listeners with some knowledge of German both
significantly less accurate than native German listeners when identifying a voice speaking German). But see Schiller
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Decreased accuracy in identifying accented and foreign language-speaking voices is
probably attributable to an expertise effect.182 By repeated exposure to a language or accent,
listeners learn to perceive, understand and attend to subtle but important differences between
speakers in syntax, pronunciation, emphasis, and so forth. Listeners unfamiliar with the meaning
or manner of speech miss those clues and thus make more errors in identification.183 As stated
above, judges have sometimes implicitly recognized this problem. Some judges, however, have
inappropriately labelled this a problem of “cross-racial” voice identification. 184 They are
presumably borrowing from the eyewitness identification context in which “cross-racial”
identification has been classified as a matter of particular concern185 but it would be better to
refer to, and focus on, unfamiliar accents and languages. This was perhaps best illustrated by a
1998 study that found that British and American listeners, Caucasian and non-Caucasian alike,
were all significantly better at identifying voices of various races from their home country than
from a foreign country.186 Lack of familiarity can coincide with dissimilarity of race but it is
really a function of differences in geography, culture, education, etc.187
i) Distinctiveness

and Köster, supra note XXX at 180 (English speaking listeners with some knowledge of German as accurate as
native German speaking listeners at identifying a voice speaking German). Regretfully, Sullivan and Schlichting,
ibid, did not compare their results with native Swedish speaking listeners.
181
The studies were generally imprecise as to the amount of knowledge the test subjects had of the foreign language.
182
See, e.g., Stevenage, “The ‘other-accent’ effect,” supra note XXX.
183
Identification accuracy is affected not just by repeatedly hearing the sounds of a foreign accent or language but
also by understanding the content of the words spoken. See, e.g., Köster and Schiller, supra note XXX at 25.
184
See, e.g., Pinch, supra note XXX at para 75 (mentioning “the dangers and potential prejudice of cross-racial
voice identification evidence”); Masters, supra note XXX at para 47.
185
E.g., R v Richards (2004), 186 CCC (3d) 333 at para 32 (Ont CA).
186
Nathan Doty, “The influence of nationality on the accuracy of face and voice recognition” (1998) 111 American
Journal of Psychology 191 at 196 and 202-204. Voices from the United States, England, Belize and France were
used. They were predominantly Caucasian voices but a substantial minority was non-Caucasian. Listeners were
Caucasian, African-American, African-English, Hispanic and Middle Eastern.
187
See, e.g., Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 114: “accents differ as a function
of factors other than simply race/ethnicity. Circumstances such as socioeconomic factors, education, historical and
political groupings over time, and geographical regions of various sizes may play a role in affecting accents.”
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Courts quite frequently refer to the distinctiveness of the perpetrator’s voice (or lack
thereof) as a basis for assessing the reliability of a voice identification. This is not a reference to
the perpetrator’s manner of speaking, but rather to some inherent characteristic of the voice, such
as pitch, nasality, or hoarseness.188 Several courts, for example, have asked whether there is
“some peculiarity or distinctiveness to the [accused’s] voice that would make it more readily
identifiable.” 189 A finding that there is enhances reliability. 190 A finding that there is not
sometimes diminishes reliability.191
Two studies have specifically tried to examine voice distinctiveness. The first found that
distinctive voices were more accurately identified than non-distinctive voices in some
experimental conditions but less accurately identified in other conditions, with a substantial
number of errors being made.192 The second study found a more consistent (positive) impact of
distinctiveness193 but only in experimental conditions where the target was absent from the
lineup.194
These two studies leave one in a state of uncertainty regarding the impact of voice
distinctiveness. Perhaps more importantly, they really tell us nothing about what specific
188

Courts do sometimes refer to the distinctiveness of the perpetrator’s manner of speaking (for example, repeated
use of a particular phrase) but I do not examine that factor here due to the paucity of available research on the topic.
189
E.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 25; J.E., supra note XXX at para 29; Whalen, supra note XXX at para
47. All these cases are citing language mentioned in Williams, supra note XXX at para 13.
190
See, e.g., Pinch, supra note XXX at para 87.
191
See, e.g., Clouthier, supra note XXX at para 20, where the Court discounted evidence by an earwitness that the
robber had an Ottawa Valley accent on the basis that “this robbery occurred in a place where such an accent is
commonplace.”
192
Orchard, supra note XXX at 256 (distinctive voices properly rejected more commonly than non-distinctive
voices in a target-absent lineup when speech was whispered both at exposure and at test; distinctive voices less
commonly identified than non-distinctive voices in a target-present lineup both when speech was whispered at
exposure and normal at test and when speech was normal at exposure and at test).
193
The study technically examined the effects of typicality rather than distinctiveness per se, but I am including the
study here on the assumption that an atypical voice is a distinctive voice.
194
J. Mullenix et al, “Typicality Effects on Memory for Voice: Implications for Earwitness Testimony” (2011) 25
Applied Cognitive Psychology 29 at 31-32 (test subjects more likely to mistake one typical voice for another typical
voice than to mistake an atypical voice for another atypical voice, although they were about equally accurate in
correctly recognizing both atypical and typical voices).
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(allegedly distinctive) voice characteristics facilitate identification. The voices labelled
distinctive in the studies were judged to be so by the experimenters and people assisting them but
no indication was given as to the characteristic(s) of the voices that made them distinctive, or
even whether they were all distinctive in the same way.195 In the first study, in fact, a distinctive
voice was simply defined as “highly striking and not likely to be confused with other voices.”196
The two studies, therefore, really only show that voices exist which are distinctive enough to
allow, to some extent, for easier identification, and that a group of people is, to some extent,
capable of spotting such voices. That is of little assistance to a court charged with assessing the
weight to give to an identification made by a single witness based in whole or in part on that
witness’ personal belief that the voice is distinctive in some particular or undefined way.
It seems obviously true that some voices will be easier to identify than others but there
are real dangers in relying on distinctiveness as a basis for assessing the reliability of an
identification. If the particular distinctive characteristics of a voice are not specified by the
earwitness, the evidence that the witness perceives it to be distinctive is of no assistance on the
issue of reliability. Indeed, it raises the danger that a court will determine the reliability of a
voice identification by determining credibility – i.e., by reference to the fact that the earwitness
sincerely asserts that the voice was distinctive and thus identifiable. One cannot forget that a
voice might seem distinctive to a witness only because it is unfamiliar to the witness, even
though there are in fact many similar voices. Someone hearing a voice with a particular accent,
for example, may not realize that the accent is common to a whole group of people. Indeed, in
some cases a witness may perceive a voice to be distinctive because the witness is not aware of
the fact that s/he cannot distinguish it from other voices (including the accused’s voice).
195
196

Orchard and Yarmey, supra note XXX at 251-252; Mullenix, ibid at 30.
Orchard and Yarmey, supra note XXX at 252.
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It is only when a court is told what it is that allegedly distinguishes a voice that the court
has any chance of assessing whether the voice truly is more readily identified.197 Unfortunately,
even then a court is not in a great position. Earwitnesses are unlikely to identify many vocal
characteristics, even when asked.198 I know of no research that has sought to quantify the
incidence within a population group of any particular vocal characteristic. And very little
research has been undertaken to determine what specific voice characteristics actually facilitate
(or impair) identification. Some research suggests that high- and low-pitched voices may be
more easily identifiable199 but the research is neither clear nor consistent.200 There is also the
occasional hint in the empirical research that nasality and creakiness do not facilitate
identification but the evidence is very far from conclusive.201 In the end, a judge can usually do
little more than guess whether a particular voice characteristic is either intrinsically helpful or
sufficiently unusual as to facilitate identification. Unfortunately, experience shows that this can
lead judges into error. Cases exist where a judge has deemed a voice to be distinctive at least in
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See Whalen, supra note XXX at para 18.
See Yarmey, “Psychology of Speaker Identification,” supra note XXX at 111-112: test subjects “describe only
four or five voice characteristics of the target in spite of being repeatedly prompted to remember additional
characteristics … Most witnesses tend to describe specific characteristics, that is, pitch, enunciation, and tone of
voice.”
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Some courts have accepted testimony that a voice was distinctive at least in part because it was high-pitched. See,
e.g., Saddleback, supra note XXX at para 33; Sanghera, supra note XXX at para 145.
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the highest differences from the group average pitch were on the whole more successfully identified than the voices
with pitch closer to the group average); John Mullenix et al, “Earwitness Memory: Distortions for Voice Pitch and
Speaking Rate” (2010) 24 Applied Cognitive Psychology 513 at 517 and 521 (results showing, on average, fewer
errors for low-pitched voices, although no statistical analysis done to see whether the difference was significant; no
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al, “Distortions in the Memory of the Pitch of Speech”” (2007) 54 Experimental Psychology 148 at 151, 153 and
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Yarmey, “Earwitness identification,” supra note XXX at 69, found no correlation between accuracy and the
degree to which a test subject rated a voice as nasal; Foulkes and Barron, supra note XXX at 190, observed that,
relative to a small number of other voices, two voices that “displayed a markedly creaky phonation quality” were not
as well identified by close friends.
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part because it was accented,202 even though studies show that accent generally impairs accurate
identification.203
Tempting as it is to use voice distinctiveness as a basis for assessing the reliability of an
identification, judges should be wary of doing so. Simply labelling a voice as distinctive is of no
help and we do not know enough about what specific characteristics actually make a voice more
readily identifiable. Judges would be wiser to focus on other factors.
4. Conclusion
More frequently than one might imagine, criminal courts in Canada are faced with the
task of assessing the reliability of a voice identification made by an earwitness. Empirical
research shows that voice identifications can sometimes be accurate but they can also be highly
unreliable, even more so (on average) then eyewitness testimony. Indeed, the research results
might even lead to the conclusion that identifications of unfamiliar voices should only rarely be
given much weight. At the very least, a very cautious approach should be adopted by the courts.
Even identifications of familiar voices can frequently be mistaken.
Canadian criminal courts have sometimes displayed impressive sensitivity to the frailties
of earwitness testimony but, not surprisingly, they have not always got it quite right. Empirical
research into earwitness evidence offers the most reliable source of information regarding the
factors that affect accuracy yet it is extremely rare to find any reference to the research in the
case law.204 That is not a criticism of the courts. It is always difficult for scientific information
regarding human behaviour and acuity to reach the courts and, to date, there has been little in the
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legal literature to bridge that divide. Hopefully, this paper will offer some assistance. A high
degree of familiarity with the accused’s voice, extended exposure to the perpetrator’s voice at the
time of the crime, and deliberate attentiveness to its characteristics, are all factors that will
generally enhance the likelihood that a witness will make a reliable identification. The witness’
confidence in his or her accuracy, the suggestion that the voice was distinctive, and the fact that
it was heard over the telephone are probably of no significance. If the perpetrator spoke in a
foreign language or with an accent, or if the perpetrator disguised his or her voice or spoke with
anger or emotionality, it is less likely that an earwitness will make an accurate identification.
There are no definitive clues, however. All the factors and all the details must be considered.
Going forward, a more cautious approach and a more nuanced understanding of the
factors impacting reliability should lessen the dangers associated with earwitness evidence. But
the potential weakness of such evidence is so real that we would probably be unwise to leave
matters there.205 Further reforms are likely necessary in order to safeguard the reliability of the
criminal justice process. I offer some preliminary thoughts to conclude.
Some have suggested that expert testimony could both inform courts about the factors
affecting the reliability of voice identifications and correct any mistaken beliefs that judges or
juries might hold.206 There is some empirical support for the suggestion that expert testimony
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would be of assistance207 but I wonder whether it would be of much value most of the time. Its
admissibility is questionable,208 it is expensive for both the litigants and the trial process, and the
available experts are few and far between. How often will the necessary testimony be available,
affordable and admissible in the average criminal case?
Another option would be to exclude from evidence voice identifications of dubious
reliability. Counsel have occasionally sought to have courts do so in the past.209 However, their
success rate has been very low210 and the idea of excluding evidence based on reliability
concerns runs counter to the general preference in the law for such matters to go to weight.211
The courts would probably only end up excluding the most glaringly weak identifications, much
as they have done in the eyewitness identification context.212
The most fruitful option would be to encourage the police to administer pre-trial voice
lineups,213 at least in cases where earwitness testimony will play any significant role and the
witness is not a very familiar listener. The police have occasionally conducted voice lineups in
the past,214 and the courts have very occasionally discounted earwitness evidence that was not
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subjected to a lineup test. 215 Lineups have long been accepted as a valuable tool in the
eyewitness context.
The police could borrow from the extensive study of eyewitness lineups for guidelines on
how to construct and administer earwitness lineups.216 Several recommendations of eyewitness
researchers would seem obviously transferable.217 The lineup should be double-blind, meaning
that neither the witness nor the lineup administrator should know which voice sample belongs to
the suspect. The entire lineup identification process should be accurately recorded, preferably on
videotape. The witness should be warned that the perpetrator might not be in the lineup, that it is
equally important to clear the innocent as to identify the guilty, and that one of the available
options is to not select anyone. If the witness makes a selection, the witness’ level of confidence
should be ascertained and noted.218
Earwitness researchers have also offered additional recommendations specific to the
voice identification context.219 The lineup voices should be tape-recorded and be a minimum of
60 seconds (or 200 words) in duration in order to offer a reasonable representation of the
speaker’s phonetic and idiosyncratic speech characteristics. In order to avoid deliberate distortion
by a guilty suspect, the lineup should not include words or phrases known to have been spoken
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by the perpetrator during the crime.220 However, ideally the lineup should include content using
the same tone of speech as used by the perpetrator during the commission of the crime. The
witness should be allowed to listen to the tapes in a quiet environment, preferably with
headphones. The witness should be questioned about his or her hearing ability.
A particular challenge for voice lineups may be finding appropriate foils. The foils should
match any descriptions of the perpetrator’s voice given by witnesses and should broadly match
the suspect’s voice in terms of accent, pitch and speech rate as well as the suspect in terms of age,
gender, ethnicity and, if possible, socioeconomic background. Finding such individuals may not
be easy to do and may even require the assistance of linguistics experts.221 Five or six foils is
sufficient. They should not be allowed to hear the suspect’s voice prior to tape recording so that
they cannot mimic or differentiate theirs from the suspect’s voice, conciously or not.
Another challenge for voice lineups may be obtaining an adequate voice sample from the
suspect. The police can request a sample for purposes of holding a lineup but a suspect has the
right to remain silent and may not speak, or speak naturally, knowing that the recording will be
used for an identification procedure. An alternative source might be a portion of a recorded
police interview but that comes with potential dangers.222 The words spoken may signal to the
listener that the speaker is under suspicion and foils uttering the same words may find it difficult
220
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to replicate the stress and emotionality felt and conveyed by the suspect; one study, using
samples from a real police interview, found that it was easy for random listeners to pick out the
suspect in the lineup.223 Ideally, samples of spontaneous, casual speech would be used.224 Police
who have intercepted the suspect’s communications during the investigation of the offence
would probably have easiest access to such samples. Police in other cases could try to conduct a
relaxed, non-accusatorial interview at the police station, clearly separated from any interrogation.
More realistically, they may have to obtain judicial authorization to wiretap the accused postarrest.225
I do not minimize the challenges involved in creating voice lineups, and I do not suggest
that change can happen overnight.226 I also acknowledge that, to date, most courts have been
largely indifferent to the lack of a lineup.227 But the general frailty of voice identification for all
but the most familiar listeners is so apparent that we would be foolish not to try to seek out the
information that lineups can provide. Until we do, perhaps the best advice for a court assessing
proof of identity is to focus as much as possible on evidence in the case other than earwitness
testimony.
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American Wrongful Conviction Cases Based Partly on Voice Identification Evidence
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Innocence”, The Washington Post (14 Mar
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Jul 2013)

Lesly Jean

State v Jean, 311 SE 2d 266 (Sup Ct 1984)

Kerry Kotler

Eduardo Velasquez,
aka Angel Hernandez

Michael Slackman, “Parting Shots Rape
Indictment Dismissed, Kotler Raps DA
Delay”, Newsday (15 Dec 1992) 3
Maurice Possley, “Alprentiss Nash” The
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at
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http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3979>
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Innocence Project, “Know the Cases:
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Sheppard”
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at
<http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content
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Sarah Ovaska, “After 9 years, a pardon to
prize: Falsely accused man wins 1 of only
4 issued by Easley since 2001”, Charlotte
Observer (3 Feb 2007) 1B
Bruce Tomaso, “Wrongfully convicted,
he's trying to live right: Cleared by DNA
test, Dallas man still weighed down by
rape he didn't commit”, The Dallas
Morning News (12 Apr 2007), online at
2007 WLNR 8089917
“Briefing”, Providence Journal Bulletin
(17 Aug 2001) 1

James Waller

Jeff Carlton, “Man exonerated of rape in

Alprentiss Nash

Kirk Odom

David Sheppard

Steve Snipes

Keith Turner
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DNA: Innocence Project key to
exoneration in Louisiana rape case”,
Chicago Tribune (7 Mar 2005) 1
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